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THE CONFLICT OF RIGIDITY AND 
PRECISION IN DESIGNATION 
Daniele BERTINI 
 
ABSTRACT. My paper provides reasons in support of the view that vague identity claims 
originate from a conflict between rigidity and precision in designation. To put this stricly, 
let x be the referent of the referential terms P and Q. Then, that the proposition “that any 
x being both a P and a Q” is vague involves that the semantic intuitions at work in P and 
Q reveal a conflict between P and Q being simultaneously rigid and precise designators. 
After having shortly commented on an example of vague identity claim, I make the case 
for my proposal, by discussing how reference by baptism conflicts with descriptive 
attitudes towards understanding conceptual contents. 
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Vague identity claims are very ordinary linguistic items. Consider the following 
statement: 
1. Florentine Neoplatonists are intellectuals working at the court of the Medici 
during the Renaissance.  
Such proposition is an identity claim because it can be analysed as follows: 
2. For any x, x is a Florentine Neoplatonist if and only if x is an intellectual 
working at the court of the Medici during the Renaissance. 
It is plain that someone may doubt that (1) is vague. An historian may claim that at 
least one individual which worked as intellectual at the court of the Medici during 
the Renaissance was not a Neoplatonist. This being the case, (2) would result 
definitely false.1 As a consequence, the interpretation of (1) as an identity claim 
would exclude that (1) is vague.  
However, such a reply is problematic because the referential expressions 
involved in (1), namely, being an intellectual working at the court of the Medici 
during the Renaissance (MI) and being a Florentine Neoplatonist (FN) are both 
vague, where vagueness is commonly understood to refer to the existence of fuzzy 
                                                        
1 I’m not assuming that vague propositions are not epistemic; rather, they are epistemic in a non 
definitive way, namely, they need a precisification of their meaning in order to have a truth-
value. If a proposition is definitely false does not need such a move to acquire a truth-value. As a 
consequence, it cannot be vague (although, it can contain vague terms as constituent).  
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boundaries separating groups of objects. (Let P be a referential term. Suppose that x 
is clearly a P and that y is clearly not a P. P is vague if borderline cases exist 
between x and y, and there are therefore fuzzy boundaries between being a P and 
not being a P. The issue at stake is that a vague term needs a stipulation of its 
meaning: there are indeed no fixed insights for establishing those objects to which 
it applies and those to which it does not). 
For example, both intellectual and Neoplatonism are open to different 
construals. A jurist or a financial expert is an intellectual worker, but not 
necessarily an intellectual in the traditional sense, unless the individual has an 
interest in intellectual concerns which do not relate to their work. As a 
consequence, being an intellectual is a property which those who serve as 
intellectual workers may or may not have. Consider a list of all intellectual 
workers at the court of the Medici during the Renaissance and order them by their 
depth of interest in intellectual concerns. At one end of the list is an individual 
with no interest in intellectual concerns, while at the other is somebody interested 
in nothing but intellectual concerns. All other individuals stand between the two 
opposites: the smaller the intellectual concerns, the closer to the non-intellectual 
boundary. Where is the dividing line between being an intellectual and not being 
an intellectual? 
Similar considerations hold for FN. For each theoretician working for the 
Medici consider whether he or she endorsed a qualifying feature of Neoplatonist 
philosophy, say P (think of a qualifying feature for x-ism as a feature you should 
endorse if you intend to be counted among x-ists). Now order them by the strength 
of their endorsement of P. At one end place a theoretician who did not endorse P 
(and is thus certainly not a Neoplatonist); at the other end place a theoretician who 
endorsed it at the maximum extent (and thus certainly is a Neoplatonist). Place all 
other individuals from lower endorsement of P to higher. Where is the dividing 
line between Neoplatonists and non-Neoplatonists? 
Now, if MI and FN are vague referential expressions, a claim which concerns 
the identity of MI and FN turns out to be vague too. Actually, the semantic 
indeterminacy of such terms infects any proposition which stipulates their 
identity: if I do not have a non vague individuation criteria for being a MI and a 
FN, the identity between MI and FN is fluctuating over different construals of their 
meaning. These lines of reasoning lead then to the conclusion that (1) is a vague 
identity claim and highlight two points of interest. First, the informational content 
of (1) is indisputable: the identity claim between MI and FN provides facts about 
them, because their identities, taken together, convey a representation of reality 
that can turn out to be true or false. For example, Renaissance scholars debate over 
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claims like this one to capture relevant facts about the cultural policies of the 
Medici dynasty, the history of patronage of the arts, the relationship between 
political power and exhibition of wealthiness, and so on. Second, (1) is vague 
because MI and FN are imprecise designators.2 By consensus view, a designator is 
precise if and only if there is something determinately denoted thereby and so it is 
not vague what the designator picks out; on the contrary, a designator is imprecise 
if it is not precise.3  
My view is that vague identity claims originate from a conflict of rigidity 
and precision in designation. Conflict here means something along the following 
lines. In ordinary predication, if a designator is rigid (e.g., a qualified name), the 
designator picks out precisely a set of objects. Consider a referential expression as 
red car. According to the ordinary use of the term (which implies a non vague 
construal of the referential expression red car), when you sign an agreement for 
buying a red car, you precisely know what you are buying. Or, if your friend 
standing at the window says to you: hey, there is a wonderful red car out there! 
you precisely know which kind of object you could see if you walked out there. 
There are different cars and different degrees of red, but the designator red car 
individuates precisely a set of objects. On the contrary, if a designator is not precise 
(e.g., an ambiguous term), the designator cannot individuate rigidly a set of objects. 
Consider the ambiguous term religion. Whoever has dealt with the difficult task to 
define what a religion is, perfectly knows how resistant is the term to a strict 
definition. Actually, some scholars use religion inclusively, others do not. As a 
consequence, some count as religions what others refute to classify as such. The 
moral of the story is that, grossly speaking, rigidity and precision in designation 
stand side by side. If you are a friend of degree approaches in philosophy, you can 
say that the more a term is rigidly employed, the more the term is precise in 
designation. 
Such a conclusion is not true for vague identity claims. In a substantive 
sense, vagueness consists in that the proportionality of rigidity and precision is 
broken: the incapability to access commonly agreed methods for establishing what 
counts as something has for consequence that rigidity and imprecision in 
designation are simultaneous features of one and the same proposition. This 
characterization means that a proposition is a vague identity claim if the 
                                                        
2 Garett Evans, “Can There Be Vague Object?”Analysis 38, 4 (1978): 208; Richmond H. 
Thomason, “Identity and Vagueness,” Philosophical Studies 42, 3 (1982): 329-332; David Lewis, 
“Vague Identity: Evans Misunderstood,” Analysis 48, 3 (1988): 128-130. 
3 Dominic Hyde, Vagueness, Logic, and Ontology (London & New York: Routledge, 2016), 116-
17. 
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designating behaviour of the involved referential terms fluctuates between rigidity 
and imprecision.  
What I mean by the notion of fluctuation can be spelt out as follows. Let P 
be a vague referential term. The referentiality of P determines that P is used in a 
rigid way. That is to say, speakers of a language wherein P occurs understand 
prima facie P as if it individuates a set of objects. Nonetheless, since P is vague, P 
cannot pick out precisely a set of objects. As a consequence, P is used to refer 
imprecisely to a set with fuzzy boundaries. Now, while in ordinary predication the 
rigidity and precision of a referential expression are proportional, in vague 
predication they are conflicting. Saying that relevantly vague terms in vague 
identity claims fluctuate between rigidity and imprecision in designation intends 
to capture that once a term is employed, such a term is employed rigidly, although 
since it is vague, it cannot be used precisely. 
To put this more precisely, let x be the referent of the referential term P 
(and Q). Then, the proposition “that any x being a P (and a Q)” is vague involves 
that the semantic intuitions at work in P (and Q) reveal the predicative 
impossibility to establish a proportionality relation between referential rigidity and 
precision of P (and Q).  
I will set forth a case as evidence for my thesis. Michelangelo is possibly the 
most important intellectual among Florentine Neoplatonists. Suppose dividing 
Michelangelo’s lifeline into different segments. Let Mx stands for “Michelangelo at 
the age of x”, so that: 
M0 stands for Michelangelo’s lifeline segment at the age of 0; 
M1 stands for Michelangelo’s lifeline segment at the age of 1; 
… 
… 
… 
Mx stands for Michelangelo’s lifeline segment at the age of x; 
… 
… 
… 
Mn stands for Michelangelo’s lifeline segment at the age of n. 
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According to Kripke’s seminal analysis for proper names, which established the 
definition of the notion, the name Michelangelo is a rigid designator.4 This means 
that the use of the name Michelangelo to refer to the individual universally known 
by that name is rigidly determined. I can conceive counterfactual worlds wherein 
Michelangelo did not become an artist, was not a Florentine Neoplatonist, or even 
had never been born. Even so, each of these conceptions refers to the very same 
individual, Michelangelo.5 
Now, each segment of Michelangelo’s lifeline is represented by M0, M1, …, 
Mx, …, Mn,  abbreviated expression that refer to Michelangelo at a certain age. 
They are therefore referential terms for Michelangelo and can be used in identity 
statements where the proper name Michelangelo occurs: 
M0 is Michelangelo; 
M1 is Michelangelo; 
… 
… 
… 
Mx is Michelangelo; 
… 
… 
… 
Mn is Michelangelo. 
Since any of these statements has for content the individual universally known as 
Michelangelo, the proper name Michelangelo works as a rigid designator in each of 
them, accordingly to Kripke’s definition. So far, so good. 
However, each of M0, M1, …, Mx, …, Mn is used imprecisely in referring to 
Michelangelo, because: (a) any Mx and Mx+1 are continuous over slight temporal 
changes, and, as a consequence, it cannot be detected what criteria strictly 
individuate them; (b) they cannot be substituted one for another in statements 
about Michelangelo within any predicative context. For example, Michelangelo 
completed his statue David in 1504, when he was 29. So, while it is true that Mi 
carved David (where i is greater than 29), it is not true that Mi carved it (where i is 
                                                        
4 Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 48. 
5 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 77. 
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less than 29). As a consequence, if x is less than 29, and y is greater than 29, Mx and 
My are both Michelangelo, but what is true of Mx is not true of My. 
It seems evident then that, while it is not vague whether Michelangelo 
carved David and each of M0, M1, …, Mx, …, Mn is Michelangelo (according to the 
intuition that proper names are rigid designators), M0, M1, …, Mx, …, Mn are 
imprecise designators for the individual known as Michelangelo and constitute a 
set of vague descriptions for him. 
Why do they constitute a set of vague descriptions? After all, each member 
of the set describes Michelangelo: it seems there are no borderline cases in being 
Michelangelo. To see why they do, consider what mereological constitution is. In a 
contribution to the debate on the metaphysics of time,6 Ted Sider argues that 
individuating compounded objects in a given instant of time always raises issues of 
vagueness because the diachronic composition which determines how an object is 
numerically distinct from others can be captured in terms which may generate a 
sorites paradox.7 The core problem consists in that the temporal changes of an 
object seems to be continuous over a range of slightly indiscernible differences.  
For example, it is notorious that while in his early years Michelangelo 
worked mainly as sculptor and painter, in his later years he accepted exclusively 
jobs in architecture. Naturally, he began to work as architect from his early years, 
and continued to paint and carve privately in his later years too. As a consequence, 
although it is true that Michelangelo was mainly a sculptor and a painter in his 
youth and an architect in his old age, it is not easy to see when the change in his 
artistic inclinations occurs.  
According to the logic of Sider’s argument, a tri-dimensionalist reading of 
Michelangelo’s life is committed to the acceptance of ontic vagueness. If being a 
painter and a sculptor is essential to Michelangelo (as it seems reasonable to 
assume), and being an architect is essential too, Michelangelo fluctuates from being 
a painter and a sculptor to being an architect; there are fuzzy boundaries between 
his early and late years. This means that the object Michelangelo had a fluctuating 
nature, and it is not determinate for which value of i the proposition Mi was 
mainly a sculptor and a painter is true. On the contrary, a four-dimensionalist 
reading of Michelangelo’s life does not raise such a problem, because if 
Michelangelo had extended in time, he had temporal parts for which he was a 
painter and a sculptor, temporal parts for which he was a painter, a sculptor, and to 
                                                        
6 Ted Sider, Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2001). 
7 Achille Varzi, “Change, Temporal Parts, and the Argument from Vagueness,” Dialectica 59, 4 
(2005): 488-89. 
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a lesser extent an architect, temporal parts for which he was an architect and to a 
lesser extent a painter and a sculptor, and, finally, temporal parts for which he was 
an architect.   
Now, since Sider holds that ontic vagueness is not an option, in order to 
block the assumption of this kind of vagueness from the problems related to 
diachronic composition, it is necessary to endorse a four-dimensionalist theory of 
time. Varzi and others doubt that such move actually works, since there seems not 
to be an implicature relation between diachronic composition and four-
dimensionalism. Nonetheless, if one inclines to evaluating vagueness as a semantic 
fact, Sider’s argument has to be blocked somewhere. Achille Varzi provides an 
analytical overview of what costs rejecting one or the other premise of the 
argument involves.8 However, my view is that one can pursue a strategy which is 
not set forth by Varzi's conclusions, by denying that Sider's argument should be 
answered. 
The point of the matter is actually that, independently of how a theorist 
approaches the nature of vagueness (whether it be ontic or semantic), vagueness 
generates from linguistic uses. That is to say, a purely linguistic story about 
designation, namely, about how vagueness is structurally related to the use of 
predicates which work rigidly and imprecisely at once, may suffice to provide an 
account for how vague statements work. Such a story can be compatible with a 
number of different theories; it might be the case that vagueness is exclusively a 
semantic fact, as well as that vagueness generates from a linguistic use because of 
the fluctuating nature of things out there.  
The key to my approach consists in distinguishing between the individual to 
which a proper name refers and the conceptions thereof. Although any conception 
(or counterfactual proposition) of M0, M1, …, Mx, …, Mn is a conception of 
Michelangelo, there is an overwhelming temptation to consider some more 
relevant to Michelangelo than others. Had Michelangelo not carved the Pietà, 
David, or Moses, or had he not frescoed the Sistine Chapel, nobody would consider 
the individual now universally known as Michelangelo as Michelangelo. What I 
mean is that the name Michelangelo is used not only for an individual (who could 
have been a different person and is therefore independent of his accomplishments), 
but also for a conceptual content individuated by reference to the individual: the 
content is known by accessing relevant descriptions of the man. Which of these 
descriptions is required to use the name Michelangelo in a proper sense, that is, to 
refer to the greatest Florentine Neoplatonist? Since at least some of M0, M1, …, Mx, 
                                                        
8 Varzi, “Change, Temporal Parts, and the Argument from Vagueness,” 497-98. 
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…, Mn do not take part in the conceptual content individuated by the name 
Michelangelo, they are evidently not essential to being Michelangelo.  
For example, Michelangelo completed the Pietà, his first universally known 
work, in 1499, when he was 24 years old. Does any Mx where x is less than 24 
really belong to the conceptual content individuated by reference to Michelangelo? 
Suppose that the Pietà is not essential to Michelangelo’s artistic production and 
that the Sistine Chapel fresco, created between 1508 and 1512, is the only 
necessary work. This being the case, belonging or not to the conceptual content 
individuated by referring to Michelangelo is marked by a different Mx. 
My conclusion, in line with the interpretive thinking of art historians and 
critics, is that M0, M1, …, Mx, …, Mn form a set of vague descriptions. All such 
scholars debate about the same individual, evaluating his life and work 
andproviding interpretations for his development and artistry. Each description, 
however, gives a very different account of the same object, and the differences are 
made possible because Michelangelo is a rigid designator. This does not remove the 
differences, however; the conceptual content individuated by referring to 
Michelangelo requires a precisification. Each book, essay, and discussion about him 
satisfies that requirement exactly.   
Notoriously, van Inwagen argues for the claim that attributing a proper 
name by baptism dispenses from providing a description of the named thing; and 
that such a fact gives a reason in support of ontic vagueness in face of the semantic 
one.9 However, baptism is a performative act which requires understanding a wide 
extent of descriptive conditions (for example, anything which is necessary for 
individuating the baptised thing). Consequently, the possibility of a baptism 
without description is deceptive.  
The moral of the story is that vague identity claims reveal a conflict between 
semantic intuitions concerning designation. Once a term is rigidly introduced by 
baptism for referring to a thing, it is associated with a series of descriptions of that 
thing. Although the baptism confers rigidity, the descriptions are counterfactually 
variable. This variability leaves room for different choices as to which of these 
descriptions is the cutting line between belonging or not to the conceptual content 
rigidly designated by the relevant term. If this variability admits precision in giving 
strict definitions, the work of theoreticians pushes vagueness away, and settles the 
dispute. On the contrary, whenever different intuitions about the precisification of 
meaning conflict and compete with each other in a manner which cannot find 
conclusive reasons in support of any of them, the plurality of slightly different 
                                                        
9 Peter van Inwagen, “How to Reason About Vague Objects,”Philosophical Topics 16, 1 (1988): 
255-284. 
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descriptions for the same conceptual content to which a certain name refers 
generates a vague approach to the relevant thing. This being the case, the logic of 
vagueness and its linguistic expression are not able to individuate whether 
vagueness is a semantic or ontic fact. A supplement of ontological reasoning should 
be necessary here. 
